In this respect, a historical account of the regional hydropolitics is essential in order to denaturali s e the origins of this discrepancy and inscribe it in to its historical trajectory. During the colonial area, t he s e were important settlement factors and have continue d to this day.
But the significance of this change should not be exaggerated, considering the undisturbed regional supremacy of South Africa in terms of its political and economic regional weight. It has great leverage to defend its agenda against th at of its neighbo u rs.
In any case, institutional, material and social-spatial inertia relat ing to the hydraulic and territorial policies of the past makes any attempt to alter the prevailing spatial configuration very complex Giraut, Antheaume, ; Blanchon, ibidem , Turton, Hence the claimed aim of the regional hydraulic policies is to contribute to national and regional development. A ccordingly the territories that are perceived to contribut e more in terms of value creation and number of inhabitants, in other words the urban and industrial scales, are prioriti s ed.
The hydraulic policies from the new era actively lead to a reproduc tion of the very heterogeneous scalar structuration of the national territory. The implementation of the LHWP has had the paradoxical effect of accentuat ing the already uneven water access in the Johannesburg metropolis de spite a significant increase in the absolute value of the volume of available water. This evolution among the elites induced a strategic shift in the desecuritisation of the regional hydraulic policies Davidsen, As a result, the LHWP was conceived to provide for the water needs of the Johannesburg metropolis, an urban and industrialised space, and no longer for rural Afrikaners, as their predecessors had done.
The implementation of the LHWP is also linked to alarmist water needs projections for this metropolis made around the same period Swatuk, For the requirements of our analysis of the hydropolitics processes, two kinds of actors are taken into consideration: the political and economic elites from both countries and the marginali s ed social groups. Those different actors are politically involved in the implementation of this project on behalf of their own territoriality. Nevertheless, these territories have been modified in the process and reproduced, in particular in their reciprocal relations.
Th e dynamics are illustrated by the different stances of the main actors in relation to the LHWP : the Basotho communities of the Lesotho Highlands have transnational claims, the Lesotho government has development al nationalism , 14 and South Africa has pseudo-regionalist development al ism.
The t reaty dispositions provided , among other things , for two parts : firstly , a scheme for direct compensation to the populations directly affected by the construction of the LHWP facilities loss of villages and arable lands , and s econdly , a development part designed in the form of a d evelopment f und.
This f und had a double mandate to help balance the finances of the Lesotho government and to assist in the development of the regions most affected by the construction of the new infrastructure. Most of the second part was conceived to be directed towards the h ighlands. The misappropriation and corruption cases tied to the f und were so obvious and systematic that the World Bank , following an external audit, ha d stated that its dissolution would be a sine qua non condition for the launch of the next phase 1B of the project Matlosa, The dropping of this development al ist part of the LHWP, while being an essential element in its justificatory apparatus, did not lead to the World Bank withdraw ing from the project.
Their members were relocated and their dwellings rebuilt. During the first phase of the project, 19 the resettled peoples were financially compensated on an individual basis for the loss of their arable lands. However, these compensations raised other difficulties, such as the fact that they are secured for a maximum period of 50 year s and are not t ran s ferrable from one generation to the next. It has clearly emerged that the affected populations favour the replacement of the lands lost to LHWP facilities with other arable lands.
Moreover, because of rural-urban migration from the highlands due to the lack of cultivable lands an issue exacerbated by the LHWP , most of the population is already concentrated in the lowlands, the most fertile region in the country.
It restricts the available relocation possibilities in these plains for the affected people looking to re-establish an agrarian way of life Scudder, The issue of resettlement proved to be very complex, since the only available lands were to be found in the South African lowlands — in the contiguous territories on the other side of the border with Lesotho. As soon as it was taken up by the people as a serious possibility, some senior LHDA officials felt the reins of control slipping from their grasp.
It also resulted in weakening their political claim of exteriority from the national realm. Constraining analysis to the state scale, however, obscures the uneven distribution of cost incurred and benefits accrued from the project.
It also obscures the complex realities of conflict and cooperation by restricting their domain to interstate relations. Furlong, This hypothesis makes it possible to move beyond the consensual representation of the LHWP as a shared and mutual ly beneficial scheme. This point fits w ith the prevailing discourse in Lesotho, especially in the h ighlands, that regards the LHWP as a catastrophic project with tragic consequences for the local populations : a project that has n o t kept its promise s about the work and development that the construction of its infrastructure was supposed to bring.
From this viewpoint , the LHWP could be painted as a project essentially imposed from the outside on Lesotho in order to capture the precious water from the h ighlands , with only the well-being of South Africa in mind. This reluctance reveals the lack of interest of both the Lesotho and South African negotiators in the politically and symbolically marginali s ed populations of the h ighlands. Thus the LHWP is to be analysed as a material and discursive assemblage that brings together three distinctive types of territorialities.
Firstly, the Lesotho nationalist territoriality seeks to monopolise any social and spatial processes in favour of the national scale.
Secondly, the Basotho communities claim autonomous and transnational territoriality as the proper scale of their daily practices against the interference of Lesotho and South Africa and expect their transboundary practices to be unencumbered by borders and the bureaucracy they entail.
In order to undertake this repatriation project, a stigmati s ing discourse was required , and t he depiction of the h ighlands as traditional and out side the modern world was a way to perform th is marginali s ation. It also converg ed with the economism that has defin ed the LHWP from the outset.
It justified a miserabilism regarding the h ighlands, notably by considering their usage of water to be unproductive because the Basotho were not valorising it to a significantly economical extent. This representation a dds to a long-time blindness concerning Lesotho Ferguson, and especially its h ighlands. It legitim ised this massive intervention inside its territory in the name of moderni s ation.
While the spatial practices of these populations are quite modern, they are problemati s ed by the state because they largely slip out its control except for the small interference created by bureaucratic border obstacles Coplan, Thus , this relative deterritoriali s ation, which r elegat es them to being marginali s ed territories requir ing repatriat ion , was intended to justify forcing the jurisdiction of the state onto the h ighlands in the name of develop ing and moderni s ing them.
This nationalist scalar attempt was allegedly pursued for the common good. But t he LHWP has incidentally performed a reterritoriali s ation inside the national state territory by making the redeploy ment of the state apparatus a financial and material possibility. The extension of the state presence in the h ighlands had been impossible before because of the weak means of the state and because this territory had no roads.
And it has been perceived as such by the Basotho populations Thamae and Pottinger, They also claim it on a historical basis.
This transnational territory in which they carry out their daily practices spreads to South Africa, far wider than the Lesotho national territory itself. In relation to this scale, the highlands are far from marginal: On the contrary, it constitutes the heart of this territory claimed by the Basotho Coplan, These uprisings have systematically been violently repressed. These two territorialities have tend ed to reinforc e each other at the same time as they followed a trajectory in conflict with the Basotho territoriality.
It has ignited internal clashes in Lesotho and a deepening of social and spatial inequalities in Maseru and the h ighlands. Thus it has fuel l ed political instability, which has manifested as major uprisings.
The territorialities of South Africa and Lesotho, as much as that of the Basotho , have been reworked by the emerg ence of this new transnational assemblage in their reciprocal relationships and in relation to this new scale. The LHWP not only amplified the differentiation between metropolitan and mountain scales but also exacerbat ed the social and political tensions resulting from the ever more blatant inequalities characteri s ing the post- a partheid era.
Agnew, J. Review of international political economy , 1 1 , Arnauld de Sartre, X. Within a year the first British administrators began to arrive in Basutoland, and although many of its administrative functions were integrated with those of the Cape, it retained its autonomous status as a High Commission Territory. For the purpose of administering the territory was originally divided into four districts:.
In it contained 12 trading stations and three missions. In this was transferred to Berea, which was renamed Teyateyaneng in about In an additional district known as Quthing was formed. The Governor's Agent was resident at Maseru. The following census figures were available for Basutoland in Basutoland gained full independence from Britain on 4 October and became known as Lesotho.
Jonathan Leabua became the country's first Prime Minister. Lesotho was also rocked by a military takeover, which forced King Moshoeshoe II into exile. Constitutional government was restored in after 23 years of authoritarian rule, which included seven years of military rule. Lesotho is the main supplier of water to South Africa and in turn receives its electricity from its neighbour.
South Africa's home affairs spokesman Ronnie Mamoepa rejected the idea that Lesotho should be treated as a special case. We sent envoys to our neighbours — Botswana, Zimbabwe, Swaziland and Lesotho — before we enforced the passport rule.
When you travel from Britain to South Africa, don't you expect to use a passport? Few Basotho feel attached to their currency or their borders — even less to their chaotic seat parliament, which limps from one disputed election to the next amid assassination attempts and strikes. A recent study by the African Union noted a "lingering threat of internal conflict'' and identified deep problems of corruption and accountability.
The report stopped short of calling for Lesotho to be annexed but recommended economic integration with South Africa. Sekhobe Letsie, chief of Koung Makhalaneng, said Basotho were attached to their monarchy, not their politicians.
We do not even print it. We buy it from Britain and there is an arrangement to give it parity with the South African rand. It should be abolished. Lesotho has only survived this long thanks to apartheid. In those days we had embassies and we received international aid. Now when we ask for help for our education system, the aid people tell us to turn to South Africa.
But his unemployed son, Seeiso, 26, had reservations about becoming a South African. We Basotho are very attached to our identity.
The thought of losing that scares me. Tyhali argues that there is nothing drastic in the concept of the United Nations having to take down a flagpole in New York, or in the Commonwealth and African Union losing a member.
He points out that when Japan play Cameroon in the World Cup on 14 June in Bloemfontein, the sound of fans blowing their vuvuzela horns will almost be audible in Maseru.
Yet Basotho, with their worthless travel documents and a team that is ranked nd in the world , will not be able to attend. He says the People's Charter Movement has broad support because it does not threaten the monarchy.
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